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JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from an order striking Plaintiffs expert witness and from orders
granting summary judgment in a civil case. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) (2008).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in striking Dr. John Goldenring as an

expert witness? "The trial court has discretion to determine the admissibility of expert
testimony, and to determine if the witness is qualified to give an opinion on a particular
matter." Anton v. Thomas. 806 P.2d 744. 746 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (quotations and
citations omitted).
2.

Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment in favor of the

Defendants on Plaintiffs causes of action and claim for punitive damages? "Tor
summary judgment to be appropriate there must be no genuine issue of material fact. The
moving party must be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When reviewing a grant of
summary judgment we view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving
part}7. We grant no deference to the district court's conclusions of law and review them
for correctness." Bowman v. Kalm. 2008 UT 9. ^ 6, 179 P.3d 754.
RELEVANT STATUTES AND RULES
Utah R. Evid. 702
(a) Subject to the limitations in subsection (b). if scientific, technical or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,

l

experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise.
(b) Scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge may serve as the basis for
expert testimony if the scientific, technical, or other principles or methods underlying
the testimony meet a threshold showing that they (i) are reliable, (ii) are based on
sufficient facts or data, and (Hi) have been reliably applied to the facts of the case.
(c) The threshold showing required by subparagraph (b) is satisfied if the
principles or methods on which such knowledge is based, including the sufficiency of
facts or data and the manner of their application to the facts of the case, are generally
accepted by the relevant expert community7.
(Emphasis added.)
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-603(l)(a) (2008):
A judgment may not be rendered against a governmental entity for exemplar}7 or
punitive damages.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF CASE
This is a medical malpractice case arising from one-year old Derek Nguyen's
("Derek") November 24-26. 2001 hospitalization at Primary Children's Medical Center
O'PCMC) following a motor vehicle accident in which Derek sustained life-threatening
injuries. (R. at 80-92.) On November 26. 2001. a pediatric transport ventilator that was
being used on Derek suddenh lost power. (R. at 5-6.). Despite attempts to resuscitate
Derek, he died approximatel} 45 minutes later. (R. at 806. 816.)
Plaintiffs claims against Defendants University of Utah Hospitals and Clinics.
University of Utah and State of Utah (collecth eh the "Universit} Defendants") arise
from the alleged acts and omissions of Dr. Madolin Witte. the physician responsible for

managing Derek's treatment and care in the pediatric intensive care unit ("PICU") at
PCMC. (R. at 65, 793.) Dr. Witte is an employee of the University of Utah School of
Medicine who was acting within the course and scope of her employment in providing
treatment and care to Derek. (R. at 65, 785.)
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BY TRIAL

COURT

On January 27, 2003. Plaintiff filed a Complaint against the University
Defendants, PCMC and the manufacturer of the pediatric transport ventilator, Puhnonetic
Systems, Inc. ('Tulmonetic"). (R. at 1-12.) Plaintiffs claims against Puhnonetic were
dismissed with prejudice after those two parties reached a settlement. (R. at 203-209.)
Plaintiff asserted causes of action for negligence, failure to obtain informed
consent and intentional infliction of emotional distress against the University Defendants
and PCMC. Plaintiff also asserted a claim for punitive damages. (R. at 88-91.) PCMC
filed motions for partial summary judgment with respect to Plaintiffs cause of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress and claim for punitive damages. (R. at 525616, 617-669.) The University Defendants joined both motions. (R. at 689-692, 694735.) At a July 23, 2008 hearing, the trial court granted the motions. (R. at 3400 at pp.
72-74, 84-85.) The Court's rulings are reflected in two orders entered on August 14,
2008. (R. at 3381-3383, 3387-3388.)
The University7 Defendants filed a motion strike Dr. John Goldenring as an expert
witness. (R. at 738-871.) PCMC joined that motion. (R. at 959-1061.) Following a
hearing, the trial court granted the motion in an eight-page Ruling dated July 29. 2008.

(R. at 2589-2596.) The trial court's Ruling is reflected in an order entered on August 15.
2008. (R. at 3392-3394.)
After the trial court struck Dr. Goldenring. PCMC filed a motion for summary
judgment with respect to Plaintiffs two remaining causes of action for negligence and
failure to obtain informed consent. (R. at 2746-2906.) The University Defendants joined
the motion. (R. at 2907-2909.) The trial court granted the motion at an August 1. 2008
hearing. (R. at 3531 at pp. 13-14—Tr. of 8/1/08 Hearing.) The trial court's ruling is
reflected in an order that was entered on August 15. 2008. (R. at 3396-3398.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
DEREK'S MEDICAL CONDITIONAND
1.

HISHEALTHCARE

PROVIDERS

On November 24. 2001. Derek was transported to PCMC via helicopter and

admitted to the PICU with multiple life-threatening injuries, including a degloving scalp
laceration, facial lacerations, fractured skull, a brain injur}7, contusions to both lungs and
lacerations to intra-abdominal organs. (R. at 807-807. 3400 at p. 4.)
2.

Dr. Madolin Witte was Derek's attending physician at PCMC. Dr. Witte is

an employee of the University of Utah School of Medicine, where she has held faculty
appointments in the Division of Pediatric Critical Care and Division of Pediatric
Pulmonary Medicine for the past 20 years. Dr. Witte "s clinical practice of medicine is
limited to providing inpatient critical care and pulmonary care to pediatric patients at
PCMC. (R. at 785. 793.)
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3.

After graduating from medical school, Dr. Witte completed residency

training in pediatrics, followed by fellowship training in pediatric pulmonary medicine
and pediatric critical care medicine. Dr. Witte is board certified in pediatrics. She also
holds subspecialty board certifications in both pediatric critical care medicine and
pediatric pulmonology. (R. at 786, 788.)
4.

During Derek's three-day hospitalization, Dr. Witte obtained consultations

from other physicians about various aspects of Derek's medical condition. The consulted
physicians were from trauma surgery, neurosurgery, orthopedic surgery, ophthalmology,
cardiology and plastic surgery. Dr. Witte also received input about Derek's condition
from a PICU fellow, PICU residents, respiratory therapists and PICU nurses. (R. at 793,
3400 at p. 6.)
5.

While Dr. Witte obtained input from many other health care providers, she

retained ultimate responsibility for making decisions about Derek's treatment and care.
(R. at 793.)
6.

Derek's two most pressing medical problems were his brain injur}7 and

injury to his lungs. The brain injury had caused swelling and elevated intracranial
pressures (;*ICPs")? which were being monitored. Elevated ICPs can cause inadequate
blood supply to the brain, resulting in permanent neurologic injur}7 or death. The
adequacy of blood perfusion to Derek's brain was also being monitored and measured in
units of cerebral perfusion pressure ("CPPs"). (R. at 791, 794. 806, 845.)

7.

Despite aggressive treatment of Derek's brain injur}7, his elevated ICPs and

low CPPs worsened. By November 26. Derek's ICPs were in the mid to high twenties.
A normal ICP is under fifteen. Derek's CPPs were in the forties. Even a brain injured
patient should have a CPP of sixty. Derek's low CPPs caused Dr. Witte to be concerned
about brain injur}' from inadequate perfusion of Derek's brain. In Dr. Witte's clinical
judgment. Derek's ICPs and CPPs were not conducive to a good neurologic outcome.
(R. at 795, 808-809.)
8.

Dr. Witte's assessment of the likely effect of Derek's elevated ICPs and

low CPPs on his neurologic function were based on Dr. Witte's experience as a pediatric
critical care physician and her knowledge of the medical literature in that area. (R. at
795-796.)
9.

Derek's respirator}7 failure required him to be intubated and placed on a

ventilator. Oxygen saturation levels in Derek's tissues were being measured. Like his
head injury. Derek's respirator}' condition and oxygen saturation levels worsened during
his hospitalization. By November 26. Derek's bedside ventilator had to be set at a very
high pressure to adequately inflate his lungs. Specifically, a pressure of 60 was required
to inflate Derek's lungs. A normal inflation pressure would be in the teens. Despite this
extreme pressure setting. Derek's oxygen saturation levels were not adequate. (R. at 804.
806-807.809.)
10.

Complicating matters for Dr. Witte was a concern that treatment of Derek's

brain injur} was compounding his lung injur} and vise versa. Specificalh. Dr. Witte was
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concerned that measures being taken to increase Derek's CPP could be causing or
contributing to poor heart function. In fact, by November 26, Dr. Witte was concerned
that Derek could go into cardiopulmonary arrest within hours. Dr. Witte was also
concerned that Derek's poor heart function and the treatment of his lung injuries with
high pressure ventilation may be causing elevated ICPs. (R. at 791, 795. 804, 806, 809.)
DECISION TO OBTAIN A BRAIN CT SCAN
11.

Dr. Witte's assessment of Derek's worsening cardiopulmonary and brain

conditions led her to question whether a different course of treatment should be pursued.
In particular, Dr. Witte questioned whether an intracranial bleed or a blood clot in
Derek's brain was causing his worsening ICPs and CPPs. If so, surgery could be
performed to treat the bleeding or clotting. If, however, bleeding or clotting was not
present and the swelling of Derek's brain was not severe, Dr. Witte planned to shift gears
and focus on maximizing treatment of Derek's lung and heart injuries by placing him on
a different type of ventilator that can generate very high pressures. (R. at 795-796. 807.)
12.

By the afternoon of November 26. Dr. Witte believed that it was "very

critical" to obtain a brain CT scan to assess possible causes for Derek's \* orsening ICPs
and CPPs and to evaluate whether a different type of ventilator should be used. In Dr.
Witte "s professional judgment, a CT scan was a prerequisite to am nev\ course of
treatment. (R. at 791. 795. 807-809.)
13.

Derek had to be transported from the PICU for a CT scan. ^Tiiie Dr. Witte

knevv that transporting Derek involved risk, she concluded that the risk of not doing a CT

scan exceeded the risk of the transport. In fact, Dr. Witte believed there was a high
likelihood that Derek would die if a CT scan was not performed in the afternoon of
November 26, 2001. Dr. Witte's conclusion about the necessity of obtaining a CT scan
was based on both the severity and instability of Derek's condition. (R. at 796, 802-804.)
USE OFPULMONETIC
14.

\^ENTILA TOR DURING

TRANSPORT

To transport Derek to the CT scanner, it was necessary to use a portable

ventilator. After receiving input from other health care providers, including the PICU
fellow, PICU residents, respiratory therapists and PICU nurses, Dr. Witte decided to use
a ventilator manufactured by Pulmonetic because it was the only available transport
ventilator that could provide the level and mode of ventilation support Derek required.
(R. at 789, 791, 793-794, 799, 812.)
15.

The Pulmonetic ventilator is approved by the FDA for use on pediatric

patients in intensive care units and for use in transporting pediatric patients. Further, the
ventilator is used at other pediatric hospitals to transport critically ill patients from the
PICU to the CT scanner. (R. at 805, 1882-1883, 1898.)
16.

When asked what she would have done if the Pulmonetic ventilator had not

been available. Dr. Witte testified:
Well, it's hard to say not knowing what his course would
have been, but I would have been reluctant to try to transport
him on a different ventilator because in our experience it
didn't support patients with this severity of lung disease very
reliably, and so I think it was possible that had he continued
to worsen our hand might have been forced and we would
have tried to do that anyway. I think at that particular
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moment in time had that ventilator not been available I would
not have taken him for CT scan.
(R. at 790).
17.

Before Derek was transported to the CT scanner, his father was advised that

(1) Dr. Witte thought it was important to obtain a CT scan; (2) Derek would have to be
transported for the CT scan; and (3) there was risk involved in transporting Derek out of
the PICU. After being informed about the risks and benefits of the CT scan and
transport, Derek's father responded by saying, "Do what you can to save my son/' (R. at
1889, 1907.)
18.

Prior to being transported to the CT scanner, Derek was placed on the

Pulmonetic ventilator in the PICU and monitored for approximately an hour. During that
time, it was confirmed that the ventilator was duplicating the level of support provided by
Derek's bedside ventilator. (R. at 790. 808, 813-814.)
19.

While Dr. Witte had no concerns about the Pulmonetic ventilator's

performance, she acknowledges that transporting a patient outside of the PICU always
presents a risk to the patient's ventilation status. Dr. Witte further acknowledges that all
ventilators malfunction periodically for various reasons. For that reason, transports are
always made with emergency equipment so that the patient can be manually ^ entilated if
necessary. (R. at 796. 1255. 1890. 1892.)
20.

A number of people accompanied Derek during his transport to and from

the CT scanner, including Derek's father. Dr. Witte. the PICU felloe. a respirator}*
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therapist, a pediatric Life Flight nurse, a PICU nurse and a representative from
Pulmonetic. (R. at 794, 797, 804, 820.)
21.

After the CT scan was completed, Derek was being transported back to the

PICU when the Pulmonetic ventilator suddenly lost power. A respiratory therapist
involved in the transport immediately began manually ventilating Derek with a bag, but
Derek did not respond. Upon arrival at the PICU, Derek w7as placed on a high pressure
bedside ventilator. Efforts to resuscitate Derek over a 45 minute time period were not
successful. (R. at 797, 815-817, 821.)
22.

A subsequent investigation conducted by Pulmonetic concluded that the

ventilator most likely lost power as a result of a screw making contact with the
ventilator's motherboard and causing it to short circuit. The investigation did not reveal
any misuse of the ventilator, and the lead investigator testified that the health care
providers could not have known about the screw problem. (R. at 824-827.)
23.

Dr. Witte testified that if she had the decision to make all over again, she

would still order the use of the Pulmonetic ventilator. (R. at 793.)
PCMCSEVALUATION
24.

OF VENTILATORS

FOR

PURCHASE

In July 2001. PCMC began considering the purchase of a new pediatric

transport ventilator. The anticipated initial use of the new ventilator was on patients
being transported on Life Flight, but it was also anticipated that the new ventilator would
eventually replace transport ventilators being used in the hospital. (R. at 1881. 20042005. 32^2-3243.)
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25.

PCMC has an organized process for gathering and reviewing information

about equipment to assist it in making a purchasing decision. This process is called
Clinical Technology Management ("CTM process"). The CTM process is recommended
but is not mandator}7. (R. at 1982, 2016.)
26.

The stated purpose of the CTM process is to ;*[c]reate an integrated system

for management of clinical equipment within and between IHC facilities which optimally
coordinates and focuses the diverse elements of the 'equipment life cycle.5 These
elements include technology Planning. Assessment, Acquisition, Utilization,
Maintenance and Disposition." (R. at 3232.)
27.

A committee was formed to participate in a CTM process for evaluating

and selecting a new transport ventilator. Members of the committee included Dr. Witte,
nurses, respiratory therapists, clinical engineering personnel and finance department
personnel. The committee established both clinical and nonclinical criteria for evaluating
the ventilators. The committee eventually selected two ventilators, the Pulmonetic
ventilator and the Cross Vent ventilator, for clinical evaluations. (R. at 787, 1881, 19831986.3241-3243.3249-3254.)
28.

In preparation for the clinical evaluations, the committee discussed the need

to engage PCMC's risk management department in a discussion regarding the need for
parental approval for participation in the clinical evaluations, but the CTM committee
notes do not reflect that parental approval was ultimate!}' required. Dr. Witte testified
that she does not believe informed consent was required for purposes of conducting the

clinical evaluations. The chairperson of the CTM committee, Tammy Bleak. R.N.,
similarly testified that she did not intend to have parents of patients Vsho participated in
the clinical evaluations sign a consent form. (R. at 789. 1910. 3174.)
29.

While Dr. Witte vs as not im olved in any CTM committee discussions about

the type of patient that would be selected to participate in the clinical evaluations, her
understanding \\ as that moderately ill patients vs ould be selected because they most
closel} represent the population of patients transported on Life Flight. The record does
not reflect any decision being made by the CTM committee to preclude use of the
Pulmonetic ventilator on other types of patients, including critically ill or unstable
patients. (R. at 800-801. 2639. 3171-3174.)
30.

Dr. Witte is unaw are of any hospital policy that v\ ould has e prohibited her

from using the Pulmonetic \ entilator on Derek. Further, there is nothing in the record to
indicate that the ventilator w as to be used onl\ for purposes of conducting the CTM
clinical evaluations. (R. at 793. 1263. 1272.)
31.

Dr. Witte*s decision to use the Pulmonetic ventilator on Derek was outside

the scope of the CTM process. Dr. Witte made it clear to those invoh ed in transporting
Derek that the}7 vv ere not using the ventilator as part of the CTM process. For that reason,
no CTM evaluation forms \*ere used. (R. at 1885.)
32.

Dr. Witte ^ ievs ed the ^ entilator as an FDA apprcrs ed medical de^ ice that

^ ould help her obtain information that was necessan to make treatment decisions for

Derek. Dr. Witte testified that the decision to use the ventilator was not based on
anything other than what she believed to be in Derek's best interest. (R. at 1885, 1895.)
33.

The chairperson of the CTM committee. Tammy Bleak. R.N., denied

having any quality assurance responsibility for new equipment. Nurse Bleak testified
that when new equipment comes to PCMC from the manufacturer, it is considered to be
"worthy to be used" on patients after PCMCs clinical engineering department performs a
basic electrical safety inspection. An electrical safety inspection was completed on the
Pulmonetic ventilator. (R. at 1242, 1914.)
34.

The clinical engineer who performed the electrical safety inspection of the

Pulmonetic ventilator, Ramsey Worman, did not express any disagreement with the
decision to use the Pulmonetic ventilator on patients. Mr. Worman did, however,
confirm that the clinical engineering department w7as not capable of testing the
operational functioning of the Pulmonetic ventilator and that the department must rely on
manufacturers to ensure that new equipment operates correctly. (R. at 1915-1916.)
35.

Another member of the CTM committee who is a respirator}7 care manager

confirmed that specification testing is not performed and that it is "assumed that the
manufacturer is providing us with a safe and sound piece of equipment/* (R. at 2026.)
DR. JOHN GOLDENRING'S EDUCA TION, TRAINING &
36.

EXPERIENCE

Plaintiffs sole expert is Dr. John Goldenring. After graduating from

medical school, Dr. Goldenring completed residency training in pediatrics followed by a
fellowship in adolescent medicine. Adolescent medicine physicians treat patients ranging
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in age from 9 to 25 years. Dr. Goldenring has never had residency or fellowship training
in pediatric critical care medicine or pediatric pulmonology. and he is not board certified
in either of those subspecialties. (R. at 856. 859.)
37.

Dr. Goldenring has no active privileges to admit patients to any hospital or

to practice medicine in any hospital. The last time Dr. Goldenring had active hospital
privileges was sometime between 2001 and 2003. and the last time he used hospital
privileges was in 1995. (R. at 860.)
•38.

While Dr. Goldenring claims to have worked in hospitals similar to PCMC

such as Los Angeles Children's Hospital, San Diego Children's Hospital and Galveston
Children's Hospital, the record does not establish that Dr. Goldenring worked in a PICU
at any of those hospitals. (R. at 1927-1928.)
39.

From 1983 to 1994. Dr. Goldenring practiced general pediatrics. The

record reflects that his only experience in a PICU was between 1987 and 1991. During
that period of time. Dr. Goldenring would round on his general pediatric patients if they
were hospitalized, but he always got lots of help from specialists, including critical care
physicians. Dr. Goldenring acknowledges that "It's not appropriate for a general
pediatrician to take on a really bad case, even in the old days, without getting lots of
help." Dr. Goldenring also agrees that the current standard requires patients such as
Derek to be managed by critical care physicians. (R. at 845, 857. 1927. 1931-1932.)
40.

Since 1994. Dr. Goldenring has primarily worked as an administrator and

consultant for health maintenance organizations ("HMO") and individual practice
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associations ("IP A"), where his work is focused on maintaining contracts with health care
providers and ensuring that those providers follow HMO and IPA rules. (R. at 19281930, 1933,2151.)
41.

Dr. Goldenring has never worked as a hospital administrator. Further, he

has never been involved as a member of a hospital committee that evaluated new
equipment for purchase. Moreover, Dr. Goldenring has no experience writing protocols
for evaluations of new7 equipment. Finally, the record does not reflect that Dr.
Goldenring reviewed any documents created by the CTM committee in this case. (R. at
1928-1930,2151.)
42.

The record does not indicate that Dr. Goldenring has any experience

reviewing the quality of care provided by pediatric critical care physicians or in
reviewing the quality of care provided by any other type of health care provider in a
PICU setting. (R. at 1314-1315.)
43.

While Dr. Goldenring claims to have been "involved in informed consent

issues of all kinds for many years," the record does not reflect that he has any experience
in obtaining informed consent for the transport of PICU patients. (R. at 1338.)
OPINIONS REGARDING NECESSITY
44.

OF CT SCAN

In his deposition, Dr. Goldenring expressed a number of opinions regarding

the standard of care for Dr. Witte. Dr. Goldenring*s first criticism is that a CT scan was
not critical at the time it was ordered by Dr. Witte. (R. at 85 L 854.)

45.

The basis for Dr. Goldenring's opinion is his interpretation of Dr. Witte's

response to a hypothetical question of what she would have done if the Pulmonetic
ventilator had not been available. (R. at 851. 854.)
46.

Dr. Goldenring admits that he is not an expert in ICPs. Dr. Goldenring

formed his opinions about the treatment and care provided to Derek without reviewing
what his ICPs were over the course of his hospitalization. (R. at 843-844. 846-847. 853.)
47.

When asked in his deposition what a normal ICP would be for Derek. Dr.

Goldenring could not provide an answer. When pressed on the issue of ICPs. Dr.
Goldenring responded. "What I'm telling you is that that is an [critical care]anesthesiologist and neurosurgical issue for me. That's not my major area of expertise
and I w ouldn't tell you that it was." (R. at 845.)
48.

Dr. Goldenring acknowledges that CPPs are very important, but again

admits that he is not an expert in that area. When asked vshat a target CPP would be for
Derek. Dr. Goldenring could not provide an answer. Dr. Goldenring further testified that
critical care physicians and neurosurgeons manage CPPs because "they are the ones that
actually know that stuff, much better than I have ever forgotten." (R. at 847.)
OPINIONS REGARDING
49.

CONSULTA HON WITH OTHER PRO VIDERS

Dr. Goldenring opines that Dr. Witte breached the standard of care by

failing to consult with Derek's multidisciplinan team of providers before making the
decision to transport him for a CT scan. In particular. Dr. Goldenring believes a
neurosurgeon should ha^e been consulted. (R. at 854-855. 1346-1349. 1363.)
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50.

One basis for Dr. Goldenring*s opinion is his prior PICU experience.

Specifically, Dr. Goldenring testified. "Thaf s what we do in the ICU. We stand next to
the patient and look at the chart together and w e go okay and we try to come to a
consensus on what to do next. That's the team approach. I'm assuming they used that
approach/' (R. at 854. 1363.)
51.

Another basis for Dr. Goldenring's opinion is guidelines promulgated by

the American Association for Respiratory Care (""AARC") for transporting ventilated
patients. In particular. Dr. Goldenring relies on the following guideline: "The necessity
and safety for transport should be assessed by the multidisciplinary team of health care
providers, e.g. respirator}7 therapist, physician nurse." (R. at 1346, 3143.)
52.

When asked about the authoritativeness of the AARC guidelines. Dr.

Goldenring testified. "There's a lot of things that go into the standard of care, and I rarely
will say that a guideline on its own absolutely detennines everything because there's also
case-by-case issues, but they're very relevant. I think." (R. at 1342.)
OPINIONS REGARDING METHOD OF
53.

VENTILATION

In Dr. Goldenring's opinion. Dr. Witte should have used a different means

of ~\ entilation if it became necessan to transport Derek for a CT scan. In particular. Dr.
Goldenring believes it w ould have been reasonable and safe to hand bag Derek during the
transport. (R. at 838. 850-851.1352.)
54.

The basis for Dr. Goldenring*s opinion is his prior PICU experience. Dr.

Goldenring testified that hand bagging was ""the old wa\ of doing things." He claims to
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have consulted with a pulmonologist to confirm that hand bagging is still used to
transport PICU patients. Dr. Goldenring also relies on AARC guidelines for transporting
ventilated patients in support of his opinion. (R. at 850-851, 861, 1352.)
55.

Goldenring admits that he is not a ventilator expert and that he has never

used the Pulmonetic ventilator. Dr. Goldenring does, however, agree that not all
ventilators would have met Derek's requirements. Dr. Goldenring defers to the
respiratory therapists at PCMC as to whether any available ventilator besides the
Pulmonetic ventilator could have been used. (R. at 850-852.)
OPINIONS REGARDING
56.

"HOSPITAL

RULES"

In Dr. Goldenring's opinion, Dr. Witte breached the standard of care by

failing to comply with "hospital rules" allegedly established by the CTM committee. Dr.
Goldenring specifically opines that Dr. Witte breached the standard of care by using the
Pulmonetic ventilator on a critically ill patient. (R. at 854-855, 862, 864.)
57.

When asked to cite to a PCMC policy limiting use of the Pulmonetic

ventilator to moderately ill patients, Dr. Goldenring was unable to do so. Instead. Dr.
Goldenring relies on deposition testimony from Dr. Witte regarding the type of patient
that was to be selected to participate in the CTM clinical evaluations. (R. at 864-865.)
OPINIONS REGARDING INFORMED
58.

CONSENT

Dr. Goldenring acknowledges that risks of transport were discussed with

Derek's father but questions whether a language barrier prevented Derek's father from
full}' understanding the information that was shared with him. Dr. Goldenring
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acknowledges that he saw no discussion in the record as to how good Derek's father
understood English. (R. at 855, 1322.)
59.

Dr. Goldenring also opines that Dr. Witte breached the standard of care by

failing to advise Derek's father of the risks of using an "untested" ventilator that was
being evaluated by the CTM committee. Dr. Goldenring also opines that Dr. Witte did
not fully advise Derek's father of the risks of a ventilator malfunction. (R. at 1291, 13171318,1322-1323.)
60.

A basis for Dr. Goldenring's opinions regarding informed consent is his

interpretation of a PCMC publication titled, "Let's Talk About. . . patient and family
rights." This one-page handout advises patients' parents that they have a right to be
"informed about your child's current diagnosis, treatment and any known outcome." The
handout further advises parents that they have the right to participate in their child's plan
of care and "in collaboration with your physician, to make decisions to accept or refuse
medical care as permitted by law, and to be informed of the medical consequences of
such refusals." (R. at 855, 1317-1318, 1323,3146.)
61.

A critical care physician retained by the University as an expert witness.

Dr. Stephen Schexnayder. testified in his deposition that the standard of care did not
require Dr. Witte to obtain informed consent for use of the Pulmonetic ventilator. Dr.
Schexnayder specifically testified that the Pulmonetic ventilator is like any other piece of
FDA approved medical equipment that is routineh" used to treat hospital patients without
informed consent. (R. at 834.)
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CA USA TION
62.

OPINIONS

Dr. Goldenring opines that the Defendants' breaches of the standard of care

caused Derek's death. (R. at 1318.)
63.

The basis for Dr. Goldenring* s opinion is his interpretation of Dr. Witte's

deposition testimony about a conference with Derek's father following Derek's death.
Dr. Witte's testimony follows:
I think there was a clear temporal relationship between the
ventilator malfunction and his deterioration, but I was trying
to emphasize that it was the timing rather than the eventual
outcome, that someone who had less severe injuries would
not—would have tolerated a brief interruption of ventilation.
So I shared with him that I couldn V say that the ventilator
caused his death, and that I think without the trip to the CT
scan there was a high likelihood that he would die, but the
timing of his death was probably influenced by the ventilator
malfunction.
(R. at 1318-1319, 1892. Emphasis added.)
64.

Dr. Goldenring agrees that any opinion on what Derek's outcome would

have been absent the ventilator malfunction would be speculative. When asked during
his deposition if he could give an opinion within a reasonable degree of medical certaint}"
as to whether Derek would have survived absent the ventilator malfunction. Dr.
Goldenring responded. "It's very difficult to say that. He certainly had a chance of
survival. I'm not sure that I can give \ ou a number. I'm not sure that I have enough
intensive care experience to do that." (R. at 856.)
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This case arises from medical treatment decisions made by Dr. Witte, Dr.
Goldenring is not qualified to criticize those decisions or to otherwise testify as an expert
against Dr. Witte, Furthermore, Dr. Goldenring's opinions are not supported by the facts.
Without the support of competent expert testimony, Plaintiffs causes of action for
negligence and failure to obtain informed consent fail as a matter of law. Plaintiffs
informed consent claim also fails because the facts establish that informed consent was
obtained and because the status of the CTM process is not a material medical risk that
must be disclosed. The record does not support a cause of action for intentional infliction
of emotional distress or a claim for punitive damages. Furthermore, the University
Defendants are immune from liability for punitive damages.
ARGUMENT
I.

TRIAL COURTS ARE CHARGED WITH A DUTY TO SCREEN
OUT UNQUALIFIED AND UNRELIABLE EXPERT TESTIMONY

Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence governs the admissibility of expert
testimony. The rule assigns to trial courts i;a gatekeeper responsibility to screen out
unreliable expert testimony. In performing their gatekeeper function, trial courts are
instructed to confront proposed expert testimony with rational skepticism." Utah R.
Evid. 702 advisory committee's note (quotations omitted): Franklin v. Stevenson. 1999
UT 61. % 12. 987 P.2d 22. While rational skepticism is not defined by either Rule 702 or
Utah case law, the dictionary definition of skepticism is ""(1) doubting attitude: an
attitude marked by a tendency to doubt what others accept to be true.*" John R. Lund &
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Keith A. Kelley, Skeptics at the Gate—The 2007 Revisions to Rule 702, Utah Rules of
Evidence, Vol. 21, No. 4 Utah Bar Journal, 33, 36 (2008) (citation omitted). It has also
been suggested that rational skepticism should include the query: "Why should I believe
this?" Id (citing State v. Palumbo, 327 A.2d 613, 617 (Me. 1974)).
Expert testimony must clear two hurdles before it may be admitted at trial. See
Alder v. Bayer Corp., 2002 UT 115, % 59, 61 P.3d 1068 (placing burden of establishing
admissibility of expert testimony on part}7 seeking to present the testimony). First, under
Rule 702(a), the proposed expert witness must be qualified to offer expert testimony
through "knowledge, skill, experience, training or education.'' Utah R. Evid. 702(a) .
Second, under Rule 702(b), expert testimony must be (1) reliable; (2) based upon
sufficient facts or data; and (3) have been reliably applied to the facts of the case. Utah
R. Evid. 702(b).1
While the trial court focused on Rule 702(a) in striking Dr. Goldenring, Rule
702(b) arguments were also presented to the court. (R. at 769, 971, 3400 at pp. 31-33,
51-53.) This Court may affirm the trial court's order striking Dr. Goldenring on the basis
of Rule 702(a), Rule 702(b) or any other grounds apparent from the record. See Wall v.
Morris. 2008 UT App 333. f 3. 193 P.3d 1060.

Rule 702 was amended in 2007. Previously. Rule 702(b) challenges went to the weight
of testimony, not its admissibility. Under the amended rule, expert testimony must
satisfy the Rule 702(b) requirements before it ma}' be admitted at trial. See John R. Lund
& Keith A. Kelley. Skeptics at the Gaze—The 2007 Revisions to Rule 702, Utah Rules of
Evidence. Vol. 21. No.^4 Utah Bar Journal. 33. 36 (2008).

II.

DR. GOLDENRING IS NOT QUALIFIED TO OFFER EXPERT
OPINIONS AGAINST DR. WITTE

"By definition, an expert is one who possesses significant depth and breadth of
knowledge on a given subject." Dikeou v. Osborn, 881 P.2d 943. 947 (Utah Ct. App.
1994). Trial courts are given discretion under Rule 702(a) to determine if a witness is
qualified to testify as an expert. Id.; Anton v. Thomas, 806 P.2d 744. 746 (Utah Ct. App.
1991) (affirming trial court's finding that expert was not qualified). The record showrs
that Dr. Goldenring is not qualified to testify as an expert witness against Dr. Witte.
A.

Dr. Goldenring and Dr. Witte Have Different Medical
Specialties

A Rule 702(a) analysis must begin with a consideration of Dr. Goldenring's
medical education, training and board certifications. The general rule regarding medical
expert witnesses is that a practitioner from one specialty is not competent to testify as an
expert against a practitioner from another specialty. See, e.g.. Burton v. Youngblood. Ill
P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1985). While Dr. Goldenring and Dr. Witte are both pediatricians,
their subspecialty certifications and clinical practices are very different. Dr. Goldenring's
clinical experience was in general pediatrics and adolescent medicine. Dr. Witte is board
certified in both pediatric critical care medicine and pediatric pulmonology. and her
clinical practice is limited to those subspecialties in a critical care, inpatient hospital
setting. She is not a general pediatrician.
The Utah Supreme Court was presented with a similar distinction in expert
qualifications in Burton. The defendant in that case was a general plastic surgeon who
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performed upper eyelid surgery on the plaintiff. Id. at 247. The plaintiffs expert was an
ocular plastic surgeon. Id. Even though both physicians were plastic surgeons, the more
qualified ocular plastic surgeon was not allowed to testify as an expert against the general
plastic surgeon because adequate foundation was not laid to establish that the same
methods and standards of care in performing the surgery at issue applied to both
specialists. Id. at 248-49.
Plaintiff appears to recognize there are significant differences in education,
training and practice areas between Dr. Witte and Dr. Goldenring and therefore argues
that the Court should look beyond training and board certifications to determine if Dr.
Goldenring is qualified to testify as an expert. An exception to the general rule applies if
it can be established that the method of treatment, and hence the standard of care, is
identical in different medical specialties such that a practitioner from one specialty would
be knowledgeable about the standard of care in the other specialty. Arnold v. Curtis, 846
P.2dl307. 1310 (Utah 1993).
B.

The General Rule Applies Without Exception in This Case

In Patey v. LainharL 1999 UT 3L 977 P.2d 1193. the Utah Supreme Court applied
the exception to the general rule in affirming the trial court's decision to allow a general
dentist who treated the plaintiff to testify as an expert on the issue of whether an
automobile accident caused the plaintiff to need root canal therapy. Id. at ^ 4-8. On
appeal the defendant challenged the expert's competency to testify7 and argued that the
proposed expert was a general dentist and not an endodontic specialist. Id. at \ 17.

The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order allowing the general
dentist to testify after concluding that the plaintiff had sufficiently established that the
general dentist was qualified, both through formal training and actual practice in
endodontics, to give expert opinions in that area of dentistry. Id. at % 18. In support of its
ruling, the Utah Supreme Court noted that one-fourth of the expert's dental education
related to endodontics; that he had maintained ongoing educational study of endodontic
procedures; that he was licensed to perform endodontic procedures; and that endodontics
constituted a substantial portion of the expert's 36-year practice. Id.
Similarly, in Boice v. Marble, 1999 UT 71, 982 P.2d 565, the issue was whether a
neurosurgeon was qualified to testify as an expert against a physiatrist with respect to
post-operative care provided to the patient following spinal surgery. Id. at %% 13-15. The
court allowed the neurosurgeon to testify because he established that the standard of care
for the post-surgical care at issue is the same regardless of whether it is provided by a
physiatrist or a neurosurgeon. Id. In other cases wiiere a sufficient foundation was not
laid for the exception to the general rule, courts have refused to allow the proposed expert
to testify. See, e.g., Evans v. Langston, 2007 UT App 240, % 12, 166 P.3d 621 (holding
anesthesiologist not qualified to testify as an expert on causation issues related to
coronary artery disease).
Unlike Patey\ the record in this case demonstrates that Dr. Goldenring does not
have similar training as Dr. Witte or any experience practicing pediatric critical care
medicine or pediatric pulmonary medicine. Unlike Boice, Dr. Goldenring has admitted

that it is not appropriate for general pediatricians to manage critically ill patients in a
PICU setting, so it cannot be established that the standard of care for managing such
patients is the same regardless of whether the patients are managed by a general
pediatrician or a pediatric critical care physician. Because the general rule applies in this
case. Dr. Goldenring is not qualified to testify as an expert against Dr. Witte. A review
of Dr. Goldenring's specific opinions confirms this conclusion.
(i)

Necessity of CT Scan and Method of Ventilation

At its core, this case involves the following two medical decisions that were made
by Dr. Witte: (1) to transport Derek for a CT scan; and (2) to use the Pulmonetic
ventilator for the transport. While Plaintiff contends that Dr. Goldenring does not
challenge Dr. Witte's decision making process, the record establishes that Dr. Goldenring
has challenged both the necessity of obtaining a CT scan on the afternoon of November
26 and the selection of the Pulmonetic ventilator as opposed to hand bagging:
By his own admissions. Dr. Goldenring is not an expert in the medical issues that
lead Dr. Witte to conclude that it was very critical to obtain a CT scan wiien it was
performed. (R. at 843-848. 853.) A review of Dr. Goldenring "s deposition testimony
about ICPs and CPPs demonstrates that he is out of his depth when it comes to the
neurological issues that drove Dr. Witte's decision to transport Derek for a CT scan. (R.
at 843-847. 853.).
Similarly. Dr. Goldenring admits that he is not an expert in ventilation and has no
experience using the Pulmonetic ventilator at issue in this case. (R. at 851-852.) Further.
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Dr. Goldenring defers to a respiratory therapist as to whether a different type of ventilator
could have been used. (R. at 851-853.) Significantly, both Dr. Witte and the respiratory
therapist involved in the transport testified that no other ventilator could have provided
the level of support needed by Derek. (R. at 791, 799, 812.) While Dr. Goldenring
speculated that hand bagging would have been a viable alternative, he readily admits that
was the "old way of doing" things and that he had to consult with another physician to
determine if that method is still used. (R. at 838, 850-851, 861, 1352.)
While an otherwise qualified expert may not be precluded from testifying simply
because he consulted with another expert, a physician who is not qualified to testify7 as an
expert cannot become qualified by consulting with others. See Dikeou v. Osborn, 881
P.2d 943, 947 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (affirming disqualification of expert who tried to
become an expert on standard of care by reading and studying documents related to case).
But see State v. Clayton. 646 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 1982) (holding "once expert is
qualified by the court, the witness may base his opinions on reports, writings or
observations not in evidence which were made or compiled by others"')The record establishes that Dr. Goldenring is not qualified to offer expert opinions
on either of the two primary medical decisions at issue in this case. In an effort to get
around these deficiencies, Plaintiff argues that Dr. Goldenring is qualified to opine on the
standard of care applicable to the entire team of health care providers involved in Derek's
care even though Dr. Goldenring is not qualified to testify7 as to the standard of care for
an}' single member of that team. Plaintiffs argument is not supported by any legal
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authority, is illogical and fails to take into account the fact that the University Defendants
are legally responsible for only one member of that team. Dr. Witte.
(ii)

Consultation

Dr. Goldenring specifically opines that Dr. Witte breached a team standard of care
by failing to consult with a neurosurgeon before transporting Derek. While a general
pediatrician such as Dr. Goldenring would undoubtedly need to consult with a critical
care physician or neurosurgeon about the need for a CT scan on a patient like Derek. Dr.
Goldenring cannot competently say when a pediatric critical care physician must obtain
consultation from another specialist without first establishing an understanding of the
scope of a critical care physician's training and experience in managing PICU patients.
As demonstrated by Dr. Goldenring's inability to assess the severity7 and
significance of the brain injur}' that Dr. Witte was treating in this case. Dr. Goldenring
has no knowledge of the limits of Dr. Witte" s ability to treat such injuries without
consulting another specialist. Further, with respect to Derek's pulmonary issues. Dr.
Witte is the expert since she is a pediatric pulmonary specialist. A neurosurgeon would
go to Dr. Witte concerning pulmonary issues.
(iii)

Adherence to Alleged "Hospital Rules9'

Dr. Goldenring also testifies that Dr. Witte breached team standards of care
established through the CTM process. Because the record establishes that use of the
Pulmonetic ventilator was outside the scope of the CTM process, facts regarding that
process or alleged standards of care established by the CTM committee are irrelevant.
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Even if the CTM process was relevant, Dr. Goldenring is not qualified to testify as an
expert on standards of care allegedly created through the CTM process.
While Dr. Goldenring claims to have 10 years of experience in administrative
medicine, when probed about the details of that experience, Dr. Goldenring revealed the
following: (1) he has never served as a hospital administrator; (2) he has never
participated in a CTM-like process of evaluating new equipment for purchase; (3) he has
never written protocols for a CTM-like process; and (4) his administrative experience
primarily involves maintaining HMO and IPA contracts with health care providers and
ensuring that those providers follow rules established by the HMOs and IP As that employ
Dr. Goldenring. (R. at 1928-1930, 1933, 2151.)
The record fails to establish that Dr. Goldenring has any experience that would
qualify him as an expert on the issues of whether decisions made by the CTM committee
have any application outside the CTM process or whether alleged rules established
through the CTM process constitute standards of care for Dr. Witte.
(iv)

Informed Consent

Dr. Goldenring also opines that Dr. Witte breached the standard of care by failing
to advise Derek's father about the risk of ventilator malfunction. (R. at 1322-1323.) Dr.
Goldenring is admittedly not an expert in ventilators and therefore has no basis to
authoritatively opine on the issue of what medical information about the ventilator, if

any, should have been disclosed to Derek's father. Further, the record fails to establish
that Dr. Goldenring has any experience obtaining informed consent for transports in a
PICU setting. Finally, the record establishes that informed consent was obtained. The
risk of transport was discussed, and Derek's father responded by stating, ;'Do what you
can to save my son." (R. at 1889, 1907.) While Plaintiff may dispute the adequacy of the
information provided, Dr. Goldenring simply isn't qualified to testify as an expert on that
issue. Plaintiff additionally argues that Dr. Witte breached a standard of care by failing
to advise Derek's father about the status of the CTM process. That argument is addressed
below.
DDL

DR. GOLDENRING'S OPINIONS DO NOT SATISFY THE RULE
702(B) REQUIREMENTS

Rule 702(b) requires expert opinions to be (i) reliable; (ii) based on sufficient facts
or data; and (iii) reliably applied to the facts of the case. Utah R. Evid. 702(b). Expert
testimony "draws conclusions based on theories, tests and experience, and its utility turns
in part on how7 closely the conclusion is connected to the underlying data—whether it is
but a short step from data to conclusion or a long inferential leap. The closer the
connection, the better the fit.*' Christopher B. Meller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick. Federal
Evidence, Vol. 3. § 7:10 (3rd ed. 2007): see also McDowell v. Brown. 392 F.3d 1283.
1299 (11th Cir. 2004).
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The University's critical care expert testified that Dr. Witte was not required to obtain
informed consent for use of the Pulmonetic ventilator. Dr. Schexnayder specifically
testified that the Pulmonetic ventilator is like any other piece of FDA approved medical
equipment that is routinely used to treat hospital patients without informed consent.
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When an expert's conclusion "simply does not follow from the incomplete data he
examined, the court is free to determine that an impermissible analytical gap exists
between the premises and conclusion." North v. Ford Motor Co., 505 F. Supp. 2d 1113.
1119 (D. Utah 2007) (granting motion in limine to exclude expert testimony of
psychologist who prepared damage reports). Rule 702 does not require a trial court i;to
admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the
expert." Domingo v. T.K., MD.9 289 F.3d 600, 607 (9th Cir. 2002).
Here, Dr. Goldenring's opinions do not follow7 from the facts contained in the
record. Some of the alleged facts relied on by Dr. Goldenring are inaccurately stated by
him. In addition, there are analytical gaps between the alleged facts and the conclusions
Dr. Goldenring draws from them.
A.

Necessity of CT Scan

Dr. Goldenring's criticism of the timing of Dr. Witte's decision to transport Derek
is based on an inaccurate interpretation of Dr. Witte's testimony about what she would
have done if the Pulmonetic ventilator had not been available. In answering a
hypothetical question, Dr. Witte did not state or imply that it would have been
appropriate to defer the CT scan. (R. at 790.) While Dr. Witte acknowledges that she
could not have transported Derek without the Pulmonetic ventilator. Dr. Witte clearly
testified that she thought it w7as "very critical" that a CT scan be obtained in the afternoon
of November 26. (R. at 795). Thus. Dr. Goldenring's opinion simply does not follow7
from the evidence he relies on in support of that opinion.
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B.

Consultation and Method of Ventilation

Dr. Goldenring relies on distant, prior experience rounding on his general pediatric
patients in the PICU as a basis for his opinion that Dr. Witte should have consulted other
health care providers before transporting Derek. As already discussed, Dr. Goldenring's
past experience as a general pediatrician does not establish a reliable basis for opining on
the standard of care for a pediatric critical care physician who is responsible for
managing critically ill patients in a PICU setting.
Dr. Goldenring also bases his opinion on an assumption that the providers at
PCMC followed a team approach to providing treatment and care. (R. at 854, 1363.)
Expert testimony may not be based on a "mere guess, speculation or conjecture/'
Thurston v. Worker's Comp. Fund of Utah, 2003 UT App 438, ^|20, 83 P.3d 391: see
also Nelson v. Safeco Ins., Co., 396 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1278 (D. Utah 2005) (A "district
court must exclude expert testimony that is no more than subjective belief or unsupported
speculation").
Dr. Goldenring's assumption of how Dr. Witte and the other providers at PCMC
interact with each other does not form a reliable basis for his expert opinions.
Furthermore. Dr. Goldenring's assumption does not necessarily comport with the facts.
Inanimate teams do not practice medicine or provide care; individual providers must do
that within the scope of their respective licenses, training and experience. While Dr.
Witte obtained input from other providers, she retained ultimate responsibility for making
decisions about Derek's treatment and care.

Finally, Dr. Goldenring's opinion that Dr. Witte failed to consult other members
of the multidisciplinary team is simply inaccurate. Many other physicians were consulted
during Derek's hospitalization, including neurosurgery. Moreover, Dr. Witte specifically
obtained input from the PICU fellow, PICU residents, respiratory therapists and PICU
nurses before making the decision to transport Derek for a CT scan. (R. at 793-794.) As
previously noted, Dr. Goldenring is not qualified to criticize Dr. Witte for not obtaining
specific consults about specific issues. While Dr. Witte did not consult with a
neurosurgeon about the transport, the facts establish that the neurosurgery service had
already ordered a CT scan. (R. at 795.) Thus, Dr. Goldenring's opinion on consultation
is not reliably applied to the facts of the case.
Dr. Goldenring's reliance on AARC guidelines in support of his opinions on
consultation and the viability of hand bagging as an alternative method of ventilation is
faulty for several reasons. First, the AARC is not an organization of physicians, and
there is no authority supporting Dr. Goldenring's conclusion that guidelines promulgated
by the AARC apply to physicians or that they set the standard of care for a pediatric
critical care physician such as Dr. Witte. See http:// www.aarc.org/member_sen7ices
("[T]he AARC is the only professional society7 for respirator}7 therapists in hospitals and
with home care companies, managers of respiratory and cardiopulmonary sendees, and
educators who provide respirator}7 care training/*).
Second, even if the record established that AARC guidelines do set the standard of
care for Dr. Witte. the cited guidelines do not support Dr. Goldenring's conclusions. The

AARC guideline Dr. Goldenring relies on in support his consultation opinion reads "the
necessity and safety for a transport should be assessed by the multidisciplinary team of
health care providers, e.g. respirator}7 therapist, physician, nurse." (R. at 3143.)
Significantly, this guideline does not require the patient's attending critical care physician
to consult with a neurosurgeon or any other type of physician.
Likewise, the AARC guidelines do not support Dr. Goldenring's conclusion that
hand bagging would have been a viable alternative method of ventilation. The AARC
guideline Dr. Goldenring relies on in support of that opinion lists contraindications for a
transport, including the inability to provide adequate oxygenation during transport either
by manual ventilation, portable ventilator or standard ICU ventilator. (R. at 3142.) Even
if applicable, that guideline is a general statement and does not support a conclusion that
hand bagging Derek would have been a viable alternative in this particular case.
Even Dr. Goldenring was less than sure about his reliance on the AARC
guidelines. When asked about the authoritativeness of those guidelines in establishing
the standard of care, he was quick to state that while he thinks they are relevant, he "will
rarely say that a guideline on its own absolutely determines even thing because there's
also case-by-case issues." (R. at 1342.) For all of these reasons. Dr. Goldenring's
reliance on .AARC guidelines violates Rule 702(b).
C.

Adherence to "Hospital Rules" and Informed Consent

Dr. Goldenring* s opinions that Dr. Witte breached the standard of care by using
the Pulmonetic ventilator on a critically ill patient and by failing to obtain informed

consent are based on a faulty conclusion that the CTM process established standards of
care that govern both the CTM process and a physician's use of ventilators outside that
process. Dr. Goldenring's opinions do not flow from the facts contained in the record.
First the record establishes that the Pulmonetic ventilator was used outside the scope of
CTM process in this case. Thus, facts relating to the CTM process are irrelevant and
cannot form a reliable basis for standard of care opinions. Second, there is nothing in the
record to support the conclusion that the CTM process established the standard of care for
Dr. Witte or otherwise restricted her ability to practice medicine by using a ventilator that
is both approved by the FDA for use in a PICU setting and used by pediatric critical care
physicians in other hospitals to transport critically ill patients for a CT scan.
There is ample support in the record to support the conclusion that the CTM
process does not establish the standard of care. One. the process is not mandator}7. (R. at
1982, 2016.) Two, the documented purpose of the process is to create an organized
system for managing the "equipment life cycle," which is distinguishable from an
organization whose stated purpose is to set standards of care for health care providers.
(R. at 3232.) Three, the CTM committee included professionals with no medical training
or experience such as a clinical engineer and a finance manager. (R. at 3241.) Dr.
Goldenring ignores these facts and simply concludes that the CTM process established a
standard of care that should have been followed by Dr. Witte. That conclusion simply
does not follow from the facts contained in the record.

Even if the CTM process did have authority to establish standards of care for
critical care physicians such as Dr. Witte, Dr. Goldenring has drawn inaccurate
conclusions about the "hospital rules" purportedly established by the CTM committee.
The record does not reflect that Dr. Goldenring reviewed any CTM committee
documents, so any opinions he offers about rules purportedly established through the
CTM process are inherently unreliable. Further, the record does not support Dr.
Goldenring's conclusion that the CTM committee precluded use of the Pulmonetic
ventilator on critically ill patients such as Derek. The CTM committee's notes do not
reflect a decision being made that the ventilator could not be used on critically ill
patients. (R. at 3171-3174.) Moreover, Dr. Witte "s understanding of the patient
population to be selected for the clinical evaluations does not support Dr. Goldenring" s
opinion that the ventilator could not be used on critically ill patients. The fact that the
CTM committee may have decided to conduct the clinical evaluations using the patient
population on whom the ventilator wras most likely to be used in Life Flight transports
does not mean that the ventilator is unsafe for use on all other patient populations,
including critically ill patients.
In summary, any decisions made by the CTM committee about how it would
conduct its business of evaluating ventilators for purchase did not preclude Dr. Witte
from using whatever FDA approved medical devices were at her disposal to treat Derek.
Simply put there is no evidence in the record to suggest that the CTM committee had any

authority to regulate Dr. Witte's practice of medicine or that the committee made any
attempt to impose restrictions on Dr. Witte's treatment decisions.
The facts contained in the record also fail to support Dr. Goldenring's conclusion
that a "hospital rule" required informed consent for use of the Pulmonetic ventilator.
While the record establishes that the CTM committee discussed the need to have a
separate discussion with PCMC's risk management department about the need for
parental consent, the record does not reflect that parental consent was ultimately required.
To the contrary, the record reflects that two members of the CTM committee, including
Dr. Witte, did not believe that informed consent was required. (R. at 789. 1910. 3174.)
Furthermore, the record establishes that the ventilator was used outside the scope of the
CTM process in this case. Accordingly, any decision made about obtaining informed
consent for purposes of the CTM process would not apply outside that process.
Similarly, the PCMC handout titled "Let's Talk About.. . patient and family
rights" does not support Dr. Goldenring's opinion that informed consent was required for
use of the ventilator. The handout does not purport to establish a standard of care for
informed consent and also does not address wrhat specific information must be shared
with a patient's parents. Rather, the publication generally advises parents that they have
the right to be informed about their child's diagnosis, treatment and known outcomes and
that they have the right to participate in their child's plan of care in collaboration with the
child's physician. (R. at 3146.) The record establishes that all of those things were done
in this case. Even if the handout established the standard of care for informed consent, it
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does not require informed consent for use of FDA approved medical devices.
Accordingly. Dr. Goldenring's reliance on the handout is misplaced and unreliable.
Finally. Dr. Goldenring's opinion that Derek's father may have had difficulty
understanding information communicated to him in English is unsupported by the record.
Even Dr. Goldenring acknowledged as much. (R. at 855. 1322.) In summary. Dr.
Goldenring's opinions regarding adherence to alleged hospital rules established through
the CTM process do not follow from the facts. Accordingly, Dr. Goldenring's opinion
that Dr. Witte breached the standard of care by failing to comply with such rules fails to
satisfy the Rule 702(b) requirements.
IV.

DR. GOLDENRING'S CAUSATION OPINIONS ARE
SPECULATIVE AND FAIL TO SATISFY RULE 702(B)

Dr. Goldenring's opinion that use of the Pulmonetic ventilator was the cause of
Derek's death was properly rejected by the trial court because it is both speculative and
fails to satisfy the Rule 702(b) requirements. Causation must be affirmatively established
through non-speculative evidence. Fox v. Brigham Young Univ.* 2007 UT App 406, ^j
22-23. 176 P.3d 446. An expert whose opinions are speculative should not be allowed to
testify. Stevenson v. Goodson. 924 P.2d 339. 347 (Utah 1996); George v. LDS Hosp..
797 P.2d 1117. 1122 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
When questioned about his causation opinion. Dr. Goldenring agreed that it would
be speculative to say what Derek's outcome would have been absent the ventilator
failure. (R. at 856.) "Mien specifically asked whether he could give an opinion within a
reasonable degree of medical certainty as to whether Derek would have survived absent
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the ventilator failure. Dr. Goldenring testified. "He certainly had a chance of survival.
I'm not sure that I can give you a number. I'm not sure that I have enough mtensive care
experience to do that." (R. at 856.)
The University Defendants agree with Dr. Goldenring that any conclusion about
Derek's outcome absent the ventilator failure is speculative. He was critically ill upon
admission to PCMC, and his condition deteriorated to the point that Dr. Witte thought he
could go into cardiopulmonary arrest at any time before the transport at issue occurred.
Further, Derek's ICPs and CPPs were not conducive to a good neurologic outcome, and
Dr. Witte was concerned that Derek might die if the CT scan wras not done. Absent the
ventilator malfunction, Derek's outcome w7as still far from certain.
Even without Dr. Goldenring's admission that his causation opinion is speculative,
the opinion was properly stricken because Dr. Goldenring cannot quantify the chance of
survival he claims Derek lost as a result of ventilator malfunction. While this Court has
previously held that testimony establishing an increased chance of survival to a
reasonable degree of medical certainly7 may establish causation, the Court did not address
the issue of whether the chance of survival must reach a certain threshold. George. 797
P.2d at 1122; see also Andersen v. Brigham Young Univ.. 879 F. Supp. 1124. 1129 (D.
Utah 1995).
It appears that mam" jurisdictions hold that no recovers7 is allowed for loss of

Chance Recoveiy and the Folly of Expanding Medical Malpractice Liability, 27 Tort &
Ins. L.J. 615. 615-16 (1992). Other jurisdictions have allowed recovery even when the
patient had less than a fifty percent chance of survival. See Kilpatrick v. Biyant 868
S.W.2d 594, 600-601 (Term. 1993).
This Court need not decide which approach should be followed in Utah because
no matter which approach is chosen, there must be some quantification of the lost chance
of survival. Courts in other jurisdictions require that the lost chance of survival be
quantified. In one such case, the court concluded as follows:
Here, no expert will state with reasonable probability and
precision what the chances were that the surgery would have
worked, much less offer any opinion as to the percentage by
which Defendant's alleged negligence reduced the chance of
success. The percentages are vital because they form the
basis for any damage calculation by the jury. Without them,
the jury would be left to speculation. .. . Thus, regardless of
the court's willingness to apply the increased risk doctrine . . .
Plaintiffs proof falls short.
Kern v. Alfred I. Dupont Inst, of the Nemours Found, 2004 WL 2191036 at *4 (Del. July
30. 2004) (granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant) (copy included in
addendum); see also Foley v. Fletcher. 836 N.E.2d 667.. 677 (111. Ct. App. 2005)
(overturning jury award because plaintiffs experts could not quantify risk of future injur}7
as a result of the alleged malpractice): Wright v. St. Mary's Med. Ctr. ofEvansville, Inc..
59 F. Supp. 2d 794. 801 n.2 (S.D. Ind. 1999) (citing treatise on damages for proposition
that value of loss of chance must be "fairly measurable").
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Quantification of risk has also been addressed by the Utah Supreme Court in a
different context. In a personal injur}7 action, the Utah Supreme Court relied on the fact
that an expert quantified the plaintiffs risk of future surgery at fifteen percent in holding
that the increased risk was not speculative and that plaintiff could be awarded damages
for that increased risk even though it was less than fifty percent. Brown v. Johnson, 24
Utah 2d 388, 472 P.2d 942, 945 (1970). Regardless of whether Utah's appellate courts
choose to enforce a minimum threshold requirement for loss of chance, experts still must
quantify the lost chance so that jurors are not left to sheer speculation in awarding
damages. Dr. Goldenring's inability to quantify the alleged lost chance of survival in this
case renders his causation opinion speculative.
Dr. Goldenring's causation opinion also fails to satisfy the Rule 702(b)
requirements. The alleged basis for Dr. Goldenring's causation opinion is testimony
from Dr. Witte. Dr. Witte's testimony does not support Dr. Goldenring's opinion that the
ventilator failure caused Derek's death. Rather, she testified that while use of the
ventilator probably influenced the timing of Derek's death, she could not say that the
ventilator caused his death. (R. at 1892.) Thus. Dr. Goldenring's opinion is based on an
incorrect interpretation of Dr. Witte's testimony and is therefore unreliable.
V.

EXPERT TESTIMONY IS REQUIRED

To establish a prima facie case of medical malpractice against the Defendants,
Plaintiff must prove the following elements: (1) the standard of care; (2) that the
standard of care was breached; (3) that the Defendants" breach proximate!}" caused injury;
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and (4) damages. Jensen v. IHC Hosp., Inc., 2003 UT 51, ^j 96, 82 P.3d 1076. "A
plaintiffs failure to present evidence that, if believed by the trier of fact, would establish
any one of the [required elements] of a prima facie case justifies a grant of summary
judgment to the defendant." Dikeou v. Osborn, 881 P.2d 943, 946 (Utah Ct. App. 1994);
see also Jensen v. IHC Hosp., Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 339 (Utah 1997) (stating that once the
part}7 moving for summary judgment has challenged the existence of one of the elements
of the cause of action, the nonmoving part}7 bears the burden of providing some evidence
in support of the essential elements of his or her claim).
A plaintiff generally must present expert testimony to establish the standard of
care, breach of that standard and causation. Kim v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1270, 1271 (Utah
1980); Reeves v. Geigy Pharm., Inc., 764 P.2d 636, 640 (Utah Ct. App. 1988);
Hoopiiaina v. Intermountain Health Care, 740 P.2d 270. 271 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Expert testimony is required to support malpractice claims against health care providers
because the complex nature of a health care providers sendees is outside the
understanding and experience of lay persons. Nixdorfv. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348. 352 (Utah
1980); Chadwickv. Nielsen. 763 P.2d 817, 821 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Preston &
Chambers,, P.C v. Koller. 943 P.2d 260. 263 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
Under the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. informed consent is presumed. Utah
Code Ann. § 78B-3-406 (2008). To rebut that presumption, a plaintiff must show that the
treatment at issue carried "substantial and significant risk of causing the patient serious
harm" and that the patient was not advised of such risks. Id. The Utah Supreme Court

has concluded that expert testimony is required to support a claim for failure to obtain
informed consent i;to prove the materiality of the risk involved." ChadwicK 763 P.2d
817, 821 n.4.
A.

Testimony from Derek's Treating Health Care Providers Does
Not Establish Plaintiffs Causes of Action

Plaintiff argues that expert testimony provided by individuals other than Dr.
Goldenring establishes Plaintiffs causes of action for negligence and failure to obtain
informed consent. Significantly. Plaintiff fails to cite any testimony from other witnesses
establishing an essential element of Plaintiff s causes of action, causation. Further, the
testimony that is cited by Plaintiff on the standard of care is inaccurately summarized.
Finally, some of the cited testimony fails to establish a duty on the part of the University
Defendants.
For example, Plaintiff cites testimony from the CTM committee chairperson.
Tammy Bleak, R.N., and represents that she acknowledged having a duty to ensure the
reliability of the Pulmonetic ventilator before allowing it to be used on a patient. A
review of the record reveals that Plaintiffs summary of Nurse Bleak's testimony is
inaccurate. Nurse Bleak expressly denied having any quality assurance responsibility for
new equipment and further testified that new equipment received from the manufacturer
is considered to be "worthy to be used" on patients after PCMCs clinical engineering
department performs a basic electrical safety inspection. (R. at 1242.) Even if Nurse
Bleak's testimony did establish a breach of duty on her part, it does not establish a breach
of duty by Dr. Witte or impose any liability against her employer, the University.
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Plaintiff also points to purported testimony from unspecified individuals that
"hospital rules/' i.e. the CTM process and patient rights handout prohibited use of the
Pulmonetic ventilator on critically ill patients and also required parental consent. Even if
the CTM process and patient rights handout wrere relevant and authoritative sources for
establishing the standard of care for Dr. Witte. the record fails to establish that Dr. Witte
breached any duty that is purportedly imposed by either the CTM committee or the
patient rights handout, as argued above.
B.

The Common Knowledge Exception Does Not Apply

Utah courts have recognized a limited exception to the general rule requiring
expert testimony to support a medical malpractice case. "[E]xpert testimony is
unnecessary to establish the standard of care owed the plaintiff where the propriety of the
treatment received is within the common knowledge and experience of the layman."
Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1980). This exception is only applicable in
the most blatant malpractice cases. Nixdorf is a good example of such a case. In Nixdorf,
the defendant surgeon left a surgical needle inside the plaintiff. Id. at 351. The Utah
Supreme Court held that expert testimony was unnecessary to establish negligence
because "it would seem as a matter of common sense that scientific opinion could throw
little light on the subject." Id. at 352 (citation omitted).
Plaintiff briefly argues that medical knowledge is not necessary to understand this
case. This argument is without merit. Lay persons have no experience managing
critically ill pediatric patients and therefore have no basis for knowing whether Derek's
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medical condition required a CT scan or whether the Pulmonetic ventilator was the only
viable option for ventilation during the transport. Similarly, lay persons have no
experience in hospital administration and therefore cannot independently determine
whether an FDA approved ventilator could be used outside the scope of the CTM process
or whether any protocols established through the CTM process have any application
outside that process. Lay persons also do not have the knowledge and experience to
know what risks were material to the transport and should have been discussed with
Derek's father. Finally, even if lay persons could understand the standard of care issues
without the assistance of expert testimony, they have no ability to independently
determine if the ventilator malfunction caused Derek's death.
C.

Plaintiffs Informed Consent Claim Fails as a Matter of Law

• Regardless of whether the trial court properly granted the motion to strike Dr.
Goldenring, summary judgment was properly granted with respect to Plaintiffs claim for
failure to obtain informed consent. While courts have not addressed the issue of whether
the status of an in-house equipment purchasing evaluation must be disclosed to patients,
courts in other jurisdictions have held that the FDA status of a medical device need not be
disclosed. Patients in several cases brought suit against physicians and alleged that they
improperly failed to disclose that pedicle screws implanted in the patients* pedicles
during spinal fusion surgery had not been approved by the FDA for that use. See, e.g..
Blazoski v. Coot 787 A.2d 910. 913 (NJ. Sup Ct. App. Div. 2003): Southard v. Temple
Univ. Hosp.. 781 A.2d 10L 102 (Pa. 2001).
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The screws at issue in Blazoski and Southard were classified by the FDA as
"experimental devices of unproven safety and efficacy.55 Blazoski, 787 A.2d at 914.
While they were approved by the FDA for implantation in the sacrum, they were not
approved for implantation in pedicles. Id. The courts in those cases recognized that the
FDA does not regulate the practice of medicine. Southard 781 A.2d at 104. The courts
held, as a matter of law. that physicians are not required to advise patients of the FDA
status of medical devices. Id. at 108; Blazoski, 787 A.2d at 913. In support of these
holdings, the courts emphasized that the FDA status of a medical device "does not speak
directly to the medical issues surrounding a particular surgery.'' Id. at 919. Rather, the
FDA's classification of pedicle screws as experimental and unproven for safety are
administrative terms used for regulator}7 purposes and are not risks of the surgical
procedure itself. Southard, 781 A.2d at 105.
Here, the Pulmonetic ventilator was approved by the FDA for the very use to
which it was put by Dr. Witte. The fact that the CTM process for transport ventilators
w;as incomplete does not speak to the medical risks and benefits of either a transport for a
CT scan or use of the Pulmonetic ventilator during the transport. Therefore, as a matter
of law, Dr. Witte had no duty to disclose amthing about the CTM process to Derek's
father, especially since Dr. Witte* s use of the ventilator w7as outside the scope of the
CTM process.
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VI.

THE FACTS DO NOT SUPPORT PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS FOR
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS AND
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

The University joins PCMC's arguments concerning summary judgment in favor
of the Defendants on Plaintiffs cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress and claim for punitive damages. Additionally, the University Defendants
emphasize that Dr. Witte thought there was a high likelihood that Derek would die if a
CT scan w7as not completed in the afternoon of November 26. Dr. Witte made a
medically supported decision to transport Derek to the CT scanner using the Pulmonetic
ventilator, which was the only available ventilator that could provide the necessary level
of support. Derek's father was advised that a CT scan was needed and that there was risk
associated with the transport. In response, he urged the providers to do what they could
to save his son's life.
The Pulmonetic ventilator used to transport Derek was approved by the FDA for
use in transporting PICU patients and has been used by critical care physicians at other
hospitals for that purpose. Unfortunately, the ventilator lost powrer as a result of a
mechanical problem that could not have been recognized by Dr. Witte or any of the other
health care providers. Even without the ventilator failure, Derek's prognosis was very
uncertain. These are not the kind of extreme and outrageous facts that support a cause of
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress or a claim for punitive damages.
Even if the facts in this case did warrant punitive damages, the trial court correctly
ruled that the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah precludes an award of punitive
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damages against the University Defendants. See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-603(l)(a)
(2008). Both the Utah Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals have
recognized and applied this statutory bar on punitive damages. See Your en v. Tintic Sch.
Dist, 343 F.3d 1296, 1307 (10th Cir. 2003); Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 55, % 66, 5 P.3d
616, 634. In Lyon, the Utah Supreme Court stated that punitive damages against
governmental entities are "barred outright." Id.
In addition to suing the State of Utah, Plaintiffs have brought suit against the
University of Utah and the University of Utah Hospitals and Clinics. All three are
classified as governmental entities entitled to full protection under the Act. See Utah
Code Ann. § 63G-7-102(9) (2008) (classifying both universities and hospitals as the State
of Utah); cf. Nunez v. Albo, 2002 UT App 247, % 21 n.L 53 P.3d 2 (recognizing that the
University of Utah School of Medicine is a governmental entity* under the Act); Carter v.
Milford Valley Mem'lHosp., 2000 XJT App21,1j 14. 996 P.2d 1076 (recognizing that the
Act is implicated when suit is brought against a hospital that is owned and operated by a
governmental entity). As a matter of law, the University Defendants may not be held
liable for punitive damages. Accordingly, summary judgment was appropriately granted
in favor of the University Defendants with respect to punitive damages.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing facts and legal authority;, the trial court's rulings striking
Dr. Goldenring and granting summary judgment in favor of the University Defendants
with respect to all of Plaintiff s causes of action and his claim for punitive damages
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should be affirmed. The Court should exercise its discretion to award costs to the
University Defendants pursuant to Rule 34(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
DATED this 2-J day of April, 2009.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
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Kern v. Alfred I. Dupont Inst, of the Nemours Found, 2004 WL 2191036 at *4 (Del. July
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Not Reported in A.2d
Not Reported in A.2d, 2004 WL 2191036 (Del.Super.)
(Cite as: 2004 WL 2191036 (Del.Super.))

c
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT
RULES BEFORE CITING.

Superior Court of Delaware.
Diane KERN, as next friend of Samantha Kern,
Plaintiff,
v.

THE ALFRED I. DUPONT INSTITUTE OF THE
NEMOURS FOUNDATION a/k/a A.I. Dupont
Hospital, Defendant.
No. Civ.A.02C05001FSS.
Preliminary Ruling Feb. 26, 2004.
Submitted April 9, 2004.
Decided July 30, 2004.
Upon Defendant's Motion for Summary JudgmentGranted.
Kenneth M. Roseman, Ciconte Roseman & Wasserman, Wilmington, Delaware, for Plaintiff.
Joseph S. Naylor, Pepper Hamilton, LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER
SILVERMAN, J.
*1 This medical negligence case involves a
2-month old child who underwent throat surgery to
widen her trachea. Post-operative complications developed and the surgery failed. Plaintiff has sued
the hospital, alleging that nurses negligently monitored an intravenous tube inserted in the child's
head.
Plaintiff tacitly acknowledges that the surgery was
dicey. Even so. Plaintiff contends that Defendant's
post-operative negligence increased the risk that the
throat surgery would fail. Furthermore, Plaintiff

seeks to call the surgeon to testify not only about
the surgery and other treatment she rendered, but
also to serve as Plaintiffs medical expert on the
standard of post-operative care and causation.
Plaintiff, however, has not retained the treating
physician, the surgeon, as an expert. If called, the
treating physician would testify as a fact witness
about the care she rendered, but she does not agree
to offer expert opinions about the hospital's treatment. Moreover, if forced to testify as an expert,
the treating physician would not opine that negligence by Defendant proximately caused injury to
Plaintiff.
The court, therefore, must decide two questions:
First, will the "increased risk doctrine" be expanded
to cover Plaintiffs claim? Second, can the Plaintiff
force the child's treating physician to testify as an
expert on the hospital's standard of care and causation? The court also will address whether the treating physician's opinions adequately support
Plaintiffs cause of action.

I.
The parties submitted a pre-trial stipulation including the facts below. On September 8, 2000, Samantha Kern was born at Christiana Hospital in Newark, Delaware. She was eleven weeks premature,
weighing only two pounds, eight ounces. Samantha
was unable to breathe on her own, and an endotracheal tube was inserted into her throat to improve airflow to her lungs.
On November 1, 2000, Samantha transferred from
Christiana Hospital to the Alfred I. duPont Hospital
for Children in Wilmington. At the duPont Hospital, Ellen Deutsch, M.D., evaluated Samantha's airway and diagnosed her with subglottic stenosis, or a
narrowing of the airway above the vocal cords. Dr.
Deutsch works for the hospital as a pediatric
otolaryngologist.
Dr. Deutsch performed a cricoid split on Samantha

Not Reported in A 2d, 2004 WL 2191036 (Del Super )
(Cite as: 2004 WL 2191036 (Del.Super.))

on November 2, 2000 This involved splitting the
mam cartilage in Samantha's trachea and inserting a
graft from her hyoid bone in the incision The procedure was meant to widen Samantha's airway to
allow unassisted breathing Following the cricoid
split, Samantha was sedated and paralyzed per Dr
Deutsch's post-operative instructions
While Samantha was still sedated and paralyzed on
November 8, 2000, a nurse discovered that an intravenous line in Samantha's scalp had leaked into the
tissue surrounding the vein m which it was inserted
Instead of going into the vein, I V fluid was collecting under the skin near the child's head and
neck, causing swelling The I V was removed, and
Dr Deutsch placed a dram in an incision she made
m Samantha's neck during the cncoid split Over
the next 24 hours, the I V fluid drained and the
swelling subsided
*2 On November 9, 10 and 13, 2000, Samantha's
endotracheal tube was removed to determine
whether she could breathe autonomously Each
time, she experienced difficulty breathing and the
endotracheal tube was replaced On November 13,
Dr Deutsch performed a tracheotomy on Samantha,
a procedure where the trachea is cut and a tube is
inserted into the trachea so that the patient breathes
directly through the tube Samantha will need the
help of a tracheotomy tube to breathe for years into
the future, at the least, and possibly for the rest of
her life
Plaintiff argues that Samantha suffered two distinct
injuries from the I V leak the resulting swelling
and draining procedure were painful, and the leak
caused spontaneous movement of Samantha's neck
The swelling and movement increased the risk to
an unknown extent, that the cncoid split would fail
Although Plaintiff has not hired her as an expert,
Plaintiff contends that Dr Deutsch, as treating
physician, is available and the perfect witness to
opine about Defendant's alleged negligence
Defendant counters that Plaintiffs proof fails in
se\eral ways Dr Deutsch, who is employed by De-

fendant, cannot be compelled to offer opinions
against her will Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to
identify an expert to establish Defendant's negligence Delaware's medical negligence statute, as
presented below, requires medical expert testimony
on standard of care and causation In addition, were
she to testify, Dr Deutsch would not adequately
support Plaintiffs "increased risk" claim While she
would allow that any negligence by Defendant
could have increased the risk that the surgery would
fail, Dr Deutsch would not hazard a guess as to the
specific percent by which the risk of failure was increased, much less that any negligence probably
caused the failure

II
Procedurally, on May 1, 2002, Plaintiff filed a complaint for alleged injuries to her daughter Defendant answered on June 3, 2002 Defendant moved for
summary judgment on November 26, 2003, and oral argument was held on February 5, 2004 The
court announced this decision, without elaboration,
at the pre-trial conference on February 26, 2004
Plaintiff conceded that in light of the court's decision, Plaintiff had no medical expert Furthermore, she declined to attempt to find one Accordingly, it is undisputed that the court's and Plaintiffs
decisions mean that this case is over This opinion
explains and finalizes the court's informal, February
26, 2004 ruling

III
Summary judgment is proper where there are no
genuine issues of material fact, thus entitling the
FN1
moving party to judgment as a matter of law x A
court deciding a summary judgment motion must
identify disputed factual issues whose resolution is
necessary to decide the case but not to decide the
issues
As mentioned for present purposes the
facts are not m dispute The court, therefore, must
apply the undisputed facts to the law, as the court
finds the law to be, and m that way decide the mo-
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tion.
FN1. Johnson v. Bowman, 1997 WL
719354, at *1 (Del.Super.Ct.) (citing Merrill v. Crothall-American, Inc., 606 A.2d
96, 99-100 (Del. 1992)).
FN2. Merrill, 606A.2dat99.

IV.

Cumberbatch, actually a "lost chance" case, it was
given that absent defendant's malpractice, the patient had a forty-five percent chance of surviving.
But the malpractice had reduced the patient's
chances to twenty-five percent. Cumberbatch rejected the "lost chance" claim, but only because the
claim in Cumberbatch was for wrongful death. In
dicta, Cumberbatch suggested that Delaware would
adopt the then-emerging, "proportional approach"
to compensation for loss of chance.
FN5. 647 A.2d 1098 (Del. 1994).

A. Increased Risk Doctrine
FN6./J. at 1100 n. 3.
*3 As mentioned, there are two issues here. First,
Plaintiff argues the "increased risk doctrine." Essentially, Plaintiffs stance is:
The I.V. infiltrate caused swelling and spontaneous
movement of Samantha's neck. The swelling and
spontaneous movement caused an increased risk
that the cricoid split [would] fail and that Samantha was at an increased risk of further injury
AA
FN3
and damages.
FN3. Plaintiffs Answering Brief, at 4.
Plaintiff further says:
[T]he sworn testimony and the statement of Dr.
Deutsch could lead to a conclusion that the swelling and neck movement caused by the I.V. infiltrate increased the risk that the cricoid split perFN4
formed on Samantha would fail.
FN4.Id., at 5.
Ten years ago, while answering certified questions
in United States v. Cumberbatch,
the Supreme
Court of Delaware introduced the "increased risk
doctrine" to Delaware, in a footnote. Cumberbatch
explains that "[t]he increased risk doctrine provides
that a person may recover damages if the person's
risk of suffering a negative medical condition is increased because of medical malpractice. „FN6 In

A year after Cumberbatch, the other shoe fell. In
another case presenting certified questions, United
States v. Anderson,
Delaware's Supreme Court
formally adopted the "increased risk of future
harm" doctrine. Anderson involved a late diagnosed
cancer. There, the patient's chance of avoiding recurrence of cancer dropped from 100 percent to 85
percent, due to the negligence. Anderson holds that
the increased risk doctrine is recognized in
Delaware, mentioning that "[t]he increased risk
doctrine has been employed in cases involving late
diagnoses which allowed cancer to spread ... [t]he
doctrine has also been employed in cases involving
skull fractures and resulting future susceptibility to
meningitis."
Plaintiff relies entirely on Anderson.
FN7. 669 A.2d 73 (Del. 1995).
FN8. Id. at 76 (citations omitted).
Cumberbatch and Anderson cite with approval the
federal District Court for Delaware's Cudone v.
FN9
Gehret,
which also involved a late diagnosed
cancer. There, the medical negligence caused the
plaintiff-patient's chance of recurrence to increase
from 25-30% to 50-60%. Cudone held the increased
risk doctrine applied. Cudone, however, also referred to dicta in Shively v. Klein,
which involved a loss of chance. Shively warned against using the loss of chance doctrine for other than its in-
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tended purpose. Cudone, referring to Shively, explained:
FN9. 821 F.Supp. 266 (D.Del.1993).
FN10. 551 A.2d41 (Del.1988).
[T]he Court determined that the application of the
concept sought by plaintiffs, i.e., one which relaxed the standard of causation, "would have
been a drastic departure from the causation standFN11
ards consistently applied in Delaware."

FN11. 821 F.Supp. at 269 (quoting Shively,
551 A.2dat44).
*4 Other authorities also apply the increased risk
FN12
doctrine.
One example is Petriello v.
FN13
Kalman,
a Connecticut case cited with approval in Anderson. The patient, Ann Petriello, experienced a difficult pregnancy. A doctor, Roy E.
Kalman, negligently perforated Petriello's uterus
while performing a dilatation and curettage on her.
A different doctor then had to resect Petriello's
bowel in order to repair the damage. But because of
resulting adhesions "there was between an 8 and 16
percent chance that [Petriello] would suffer a future
bowel obstruction as a result of the bowel resection
FN14
necessitated by [Dr. Kalman's] actions ."
The
increased risk doctrine led to a damages award that
was sustained on appeal.
FN 12. See generally Edwards v. Family
Practice Associates, Incorporated, 798
A.2d 1059 (Del. Super.Ct.2002) (although
called "loss of chance," increased risk doctrine applied where failure to diagnose
stomach cancer hastened plaintiffs death);
Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation,
and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future
Consequences, 90 Yale L.J. 1353 (1981).
FN13. 576 A.2d 474 (Conn.1990).
FN14.M At 481.

Regardless of whether the increased risk or lost
chance doctrines were applied or not, a common
element of the cases presented above is that every
plaintiff proffered expert opinion specifically quantifying the increased risk or loss of chance caused
by the medical negligence. Here, no expert will
state with reasonable probability and precision what
the chances were that the surgery would have
worked, much less offer any opinion as to the percentage by which Defendant's alleged negligence
reduced the chance of success. The percentages are
vital because they form the basis for any damages
calculation by the jury. Without them, the jury
would be left to speculation. Furthermore, it is unclear whether Plaintiffs current condition, using a
tracheotomy tube, is permanent. Thus, regardless of
the court's willingness to apply the increased risk
doctrine and force the treating physician to testify,
Plaintiffs proof falls short.
In passing, the court reiterates the concern in
Shively about the relaxed, proportional causation
standard's impact on Delaware's entrenched approach to proximate cause. Unlike Connecticut,
Delaware is a so-called "but for" jurisdiction. Typically, if a defendant's negligence merely is a substantial factor in causing injury, a plaintiff cannot
recover in Delaware. The increased risk doctrine
seems to compromise that standard where a treatment's chance of success was less than fifty percent
at the outset. In such a situation, can it be said that
any negligence which further reduced plaintiffs
chances was more than a substantial factor in causing injury? In other words, if a defendant's negligence indisputably increased the likelihood of failure, but the surgery probably was doomed anyway,
can it be said that but for the negligence the surgery
probably would have succeeded? Those are questions for another case because, as presented above,
no one can quantify the harm, if any, caused by Defendant's alleged negligence here.

B. Expert Witness
Delaware law requires expert medical testimony in
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medical negligence cases such as this one.
Instead of retaining an expert, Plaintiff merely would
call Samantha's surgeon as her expert on the hospital's standard of care and causation. Plaintiff would
question the treating physician about the throat surgery she performed and try to elicit the opinion that
the I.V.'s placement violated the standard of care
and caused the surgery to fail, which made the
tracheotomy necessary.
FN15.DEL.CODE ANN.tit. 18, § 6853
(1999)("No liability shall be based upon
asserted negligence unless expert medical
testimony is presented as to the alleged deviation from the applicable standard of
care in the specific circumstances of the
case and as to the causation of the alleged
personal injury or death ...").
*5 The first problem is that the treating physician
has little or no factual knowledge about Samantha's
post-operative care. More importantly, the treating
physician is employed by Defendant. She has not
been offered as an expert for Defendant. Nor has
she performed an "independent medical examination" at either party's request.
FN16. Cf. Pinkett v. Brittingham, 567 A.2d
858 (Del. 1989) (rule preventing one party
from compelling opposing party's employee from testifying inapplicable to doctor
who performs independent medical examination and testifies strictly from own report).
In Delaware, a witness generally cannot be forced
to offer expert opinions. Nor can defendant's employee be compelled to testify as plaintiffs expert
witness.
This prevents a form of involuntary
servitude,
with employees and experts being
made to "serve without remuneration and without
FN19
[their] consent."
It is no answer here, as
Plaintiff argues, that the treating physician gave a
deposition on which Plaintiff is willing to rely. The
physician appeared as a fact witness. When
Plaintiff asked the physician for her expert opinion,

that drew an objection and the answer was given
over the objection.
¥i$\lMontecinos
v. Dickinson Medical
Group, PA.,
Del.Super., C.A. No.
94C-07-027, Ridgely, J. (Aug. 21,
1996)(ORDER); Home v. Kent General
Hospital, Incorporated, Del.Super., C.A.
No. 85C-AP-29, Bifferato, J. (Aug. 28,
1990).
FN18. See State v. McLaughlin, 514 A.2d
1139, 1142 (Del.Super.Ct.1986) (citations
omitted).
FN19.Montecinos at *1.
Moreover, as mentioned, when the physician
offered an opinion about standard of care, it was
not helpful to Plaintiff. Most significantly, the
physician attributed the surgery's failure to the extensiveness of Plaintiffs congenital problem. And
the physician did not see the swelling or Plaintiffs
movement, whether caused by negligence or not, as
even a significant factor in the surgery's outcome.
At most, the treating physician testified in deposition that along with several other possibilities,
"motion of the neck ... can detract from the success
of the surgery."As to the possibility of excessive
motion and its effect on the surgery in this case, the
physician testified:
Q: Is there any physical finding that you can rely
upon to support a conclusion that excessive motion did not cause the failure of the surgery?
A: No.
Q: If you assume that subsequent to the massive edema there was motion, could that motion have affected the success of the surgery? And if not, why
not?
A: It depends on how much motion. And I cannot
say that didn't have an effect.
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Referring to this case's facts rather than theoretical
possibilities however, the treating physician further
testified "There's nothing m the notes about excessive motion, and I don't recall whether there was
excessive motion "And, as mentioned above, the
treating physician attributed the surgery's failure to
Plaintiffs congenital condition, not Defendant's
treatment
As to the swelling caused by the I V infiltrate, the
physician allowed that "if [Plaintiff] had significant
swelling, that could cause airway obstruction with
failure of the cncoid split and an inability to
breathe adequately and comfortably after extubation "Along the same line, giving Plaintiff the benefit of several inferences, the treating physician testified the swelling had an impact on the timing of
Plaintiffs extubation And the physician further
testified that following the physician's schedule for
extubation "decreases the complications, which are
often pulmonary, and increases the chance of success "
*6 Plaintiffs complications, of course, were not
pulmonary Moreover, the physician did not opine
that any change in the extubation schedule had a
bearing on the surgery m this case, much less that it
increased the risk of failure here She also testified,
"I don't think anybody knows the precise duration
of intubation that's optimal
There are sometimes
circumstances about an individual patient that
would encourage delay of the extubation "Again,
the physician made no effort to tie the theory to this
case's facts The only reasonable way to read the
treating physician's explanation for what happened
in this case is that the surgery failed because it
failed
Finally, as to the expert testimony issue, the court
appreciates that there is a scintilla of evidence that
the child expenenced pam due to the swelling and
the minor surgery she underwent to correct it Nevertheless Plaintiffs proof establishes neither liability nor causation All of the above assumes that the
physician can be forced to testify m the first place,
which the court cannot do As it stands, Plaintiff

has no medical expert witness and, as mentioned,
she declines to find one

V
For the foregoing reasons, it appears that Plaintiff
can present no medical expert testimony as to the
deviation from the applicable standard of care by
Defendant and as to causation of any injury to
Plaintiff Thus, Defendant's motion for summary
judgment is GRANTED
IT IS SO ORDERED
Del Super ,2004
Kern ex rel Kern v Alfred I Dupont Inst of
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